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I. OVERVIEW OF THE DAVIS-BACON ACT
A. What It Requires And Whom It Protects
The prevailing wage concept dates back to the federal
Davis-Bacon Act of 1931,' one of the oldest fair labor stan-
dards statutes in the country.2 The prevailing wage con-
cept is one of neutrality and as embodied in the
Davis-Bacon Act requires that contractors engaged in
federal government construction projects must pay their
employees at wage rates not less than local "prevailing
wages" as determined by the U.S. Department of Labor.
3
Since 1931 over sixty federal statutes have been enacted
with provisions requiring that prevailing wages be paid4 and
forty states have statutes paralleling the Davis-Bacon Act,5
affectionately referred to as "Little Davis Bacon Acts".
Despite the little attention paid to it in legal literature,
the Davis-Bacon Act annually affects approximately four
million workers and over fifty billion dollars spent on
government subsidized construction. The Act and the
regulations promulgated for its enforcement establish those
wage rates and fringe benefit payments that prevail for each
Lisa Morowitz is a J.D. Candidate, May 1990, State
University of New York at Buffalo School at Law.
craft in an area as the legal minimum wage rates payable
on federally financed construction projects in excess of
$2000.6 The Act thus encourages uniform labor wage rates
that are consistent with local practice. In so doing, the
Davis-Bacon Act parallels the federal labor policy, em-
bodied in the NLRA, to avoid competition on the basis of
wage rates and to "promote the flow of commerce by
removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and
unrest.7 The Supreme Court has recognized that "(o)n its
face, the Act is a minimum wage law designed for the
benefit of construction workers."8
B. How It Works
A review of the Act's administration and history aids
in understanding the meaning of Davis-Bacon enforcement
for workers involved on construction projects. Davis-Bacon
contracts involve the following parties: the Federal agency
(often called the procurement or contracting agency) under
whose auspices the work is conducted (e.g. Dept. of
Transportation, Energy, Housing etc.); the Contractor who
bids on the project and then undertakes and supervises the
construction (often referred to as the employer); the Sub-
contractor who works on one particular part of the project
(e.g. the painting, electric work); and the Laborers and
Mechanics who actually do the manual labor (often refer-
red to as employees or workers).
i. Administration
Within the Department of Labor (DOL), Davis-Bacon
is the responsibility of the Office of Government Contract
Wage Standards, which is a unit of the Wage & Hour Divi-
sion in the Employment Standards Administration. 9
Prevailing wage rates are determined by the DOL for each
construction occupation used in different types of construc-
tion in specific U.S. localities. This requires the classifica-
tion of workers (e.g. carpenters, electricians, iron workers
etc.)"0 as well as the classification of projects (e.g. building
construction, heavy construction, highway constructon and
residential building).
The word "prevailing" in the statute has recently been
interpreted by the DOL to mean "the wage paid to the ma-
jority of the laborers or mechanics in the classification on
similar projects in the area during the period in question.
If the same wage is not paid to a majority of those employed
in the classification, the 'prevailing wage' shall be the
average of the wages paid weighted by the total employed
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in the classification.""
In compiling wage rate information, the Employment
Standards Administration's Wage and Hour Division con-
siders statements voluntarily submitted by contractors
showing wage rates actually paid on projects, collective
bargaining agreements, wage rates determined for public
construction by state and local officials pursuant to prevail-
ing wage legislation, and information furnished by federal
and state contracting agencies.'
2
It is frequently alleged that unions have an advantage
under these regulations since their contracts usually require
all workers of one classification to be paid the same rate
to the penny, and, of the relevant interest groups, unions
have the strongest incentive to submit wage rate informa-
tion. 1 3 Persuasive arguments are made, however, refuting
the alleged "union bias" in the administration of the Act.
Based on its examination of every area and project wage
determination issued by the DOL in the first four months
of 1986, the National Joint Heavy and Highway Construc-
tion Committee reported that 42.6 percent of all area deter-
minations provided wage rates that were union rates, and
only 23 percent of all project wage determinations were
union. Thus, only 26.2 percent of all wage decisions issued
in the first four months of 1986 were based on union
rates.' 4 Despite the controversy it is evident that in a locale
where'the majority of construction workers are unionized,' 5
the union wage will be determined to be the prevailing wage.
Likewise, where the majority of construction work is per-
formed on a nonunion basis, the Davis-Bacon wage deter-
minations will reflect the nonunion character of the industry.
ii. Allocation of Enforcement Functions
The Davis-Bacon Act does not assign overall enforce-
ment responsibilities to any one agency. Rather, it is the
function of the various federal contracting agencies to en-
sure that employees are properly classified and to withhold
funds in the event of underpayment.' 6 Thus, the primary
responsibility for day-to-day enforcement such as check-
ing employer payroll records and making on-site inspec-
tions rests with the contracting agencies funding the
construction.
The DOL determines the coverage of the Davis-Bacon
Act and related statutes and issues prevailing wage rates.
In addition, coordinating and oversight responsibilities rest
with the DOL. To accomplish this task they issue regula-
tions to be followed by the contracting agencies and con-
duct their own investigations of alleged violations when it
is deemed necessary to do so."
The Comptroller General also has enforcement respon-
sibilities under the Act.' 8 S/he must reimburse workers for
any wages due them from payment withheld from non-
compliant contractors. S/he is also authorized to debar con-
tractors from receiving government contracts for a period
of three years when they have committed violations which
constitute a disregard of their obligation to employees and
subcontractors.' 9
iii. Some Recent Developments
The Davis-Bacon Act has been a controversial statute
since its inception, a controversy that has intensified in re-
cent years. In 1979, for instance, the National Right to
Work Committee targeted prevailing wage laws across the
country, helping to file 52 bills to weaken or repeal them
in state legislatures.2 ° Since then state prevailing wage laws
in Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, New Hampshire and
Utah have been repealed.2 1
On the federal level the strategy has developed to at-
tack Davis-Bacon piecemeal through the appropriations
process - attaching provisions to particular appropriations
bills that would limit the applicability of Davis-Bacon to that
particular expenditure area. 22 One of the latest federal ad-
ministration attempts has been a maneuver by the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
to block states, including New York, from applying their
prevailing wage laws to federally-assisted housing pro-
jects. 23 Not surprisingly, these legislative attempts coincided
with the publication of a wealth of literature - research,
studies, editorials and articles - criticizing the Act.
2 4
Simultaneously, the DOL, intending to bolster Davis-
Bacon and to ward off some of the heat directed towards
their department, aggressively activated the administrative
rule- alteration machinery by publishing changes in the
Federal Register on Dec. 28, 1979.25 These changes in the
proposed regulations were surmised as making Davis-
Bacon more costly but more restraining on contractors.
26
The final version of these regulations was published on Jan.
16, 1981, with a scheduled effective date of Feb. 17, 1981.
However, on Feb. 16, the then new Labor Secretary
Donovan published a notice delaying implementation of the
regulations. After a series of further delays and extensions,
Secretary Donovan published new proposed Davis-Bacon
regulations which differed substantially from the originally
proposed regulations. The final version of the regulations
was published in May of 198227 and was branded by many
as having a deleterious effect on workers involved in con-
struction. 28 The changes included: revising the definition
of prevailing wage; instituting a new prohibition against us-
ing metropolitan wage data for setting prevailing rates in
rural counties and vice versa; instituting a new prohibition
against using wage rates paid on Davis-Bacon projects as
a basis for developing future wage determinations; expan-
ding the permitted used of semi-skilled helpers whenever
the helper classification was identifiable in the area; and
allowing contractors to submit a weekly statement certify-
ing compliance with wage requirements instead of requir-
ing the submission of the actual weekly payrolls. Secretary
Donovan's justification for the changes in the proposed
regulations appears to have been based on the high cost
of implementing the Act, 29 a justification which many have
criticized. The Davis-Bacon Act after all was not and is
not designed to save the government or contractors
money."
But the battle did not stop with the implementation
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of these new regulations; protracted litigation followed. The
Building & Construction Trades Department of the AFL-
CIO acted quickly to enjoin use of the new regulations by
filing an action in the U.S. District Court of the District of
Columbia on June 11, 1982, seeking a preliminary injunc-
tion. 31 A preliminary injunction was granted and in its final
deposition issued five months later, the unions were granted
summary judgment on all of the provisions except the
elimination of the 30 percent rule to define prevailing
wage.3 2 An appeal by both parties to the District of Col-
umbia Circuit Court of Appeals ensued, resulting in an opi-
nion similar to the district courfs opinion. Although in-
validating the regulation elimination submission of actual
weekly payroll records, and ordering modifications of the
regulations to require that semi-skilled helpers be "prevail-
ing" rather than "identifiable" in an area, the court upheld
the Departmentfs authority to permit a wider use of helpers
and modify the rules for surveying wages.33 The AFL-CIO's
petition to the Supreme Court was denied34 and the new
regulations became law.
But the battle is far from over. Efforts continue on all
fronts to weaken or repeal the Act. One such effort, which
has had an enormous impact on the Act's effectiveness,
has been the failure to enforce the Act. Although limiting
Davis-Bacon applicability, instituting regulatory changes
and pushing for its repeal all have significant impact,
nothing has a greater effect on the morale and confidence
of the construction worker - whom the Act is designed
to protect - than the failure to enforce the Act and punish
those who violate it.
Enforcement problems have plagued the Act since its
inception and are particularly troubling today given the
stance of the previous administration 3 and no doubt the
current administration. The lax enforcement by the DOL
is not unique to the Davis-Bacon Act; it reflects the overall
hostile policy of the Republican administration towards
worker protection statutes. According to one commentator,
it is clear that the Reagan administration regarded the en-
forcement of health and safety regulations as a nuisance. 36
Additionally, recent studies indicate that the government's
approach to the Fair Labor Standards Act has resulted in
many of the same compliance problems facing the Davis
Bacon Act, a not all too surprising fact considering that
the Wage & Hour Division of the DOL is responsible for
enforcing both statutes. "A U.S. Government Accounting
Office (GAO) report issued in September 1985 updated
a 1981 report which had concluded that noncompliance
with minimum wage, overtime and record-keeping provi-
sions of the FLSA was a serious and continuing problem
and that the DOL was not seeking maximum compensa-
tion." 7 The statement of former Labor Secretary William
Brock, testifying before a Congressional Committee,
reflects well the position the Reagan administration held
towards the Davis-Bacon Act: "I 'don't think it's possible,
Mr. Chairman, for us to enforce this law on every rinky-
dink contract that comes along at $10,000 or 20,000 or
100,000. "38
In 1988, the DOL uncovered 2222 violations of the
Davis- Bacon Act and recovered $14,972,798 owed to
17,513 employees. 39 These numbers highlight the need to
make enforcement the top priority of those people and
agencies whose job it is to ensure that the Act is complied
with.
Violations of the Davis-Bacon Act are a serious pro-
blem and need to be seriously addressed. Creating regula-
tions aimed at reducing administrative costs do nothing to
answer this problem and may in fact just make it worse.4"
The words of one contractor, speaking about a violator of
Davis-Bacon on a $400 million dollar rapid project station,
illustrate this point:
He was hiring Haitian people from the govern-
ment detention center, that were just being pick-
ed up on the boats, and bringing them to the
job site and working them for the most substan-
dard wages that you could ever believe, far
below the minimum wage.
And when this was brought to the attention of
the Labor Department, by the time they were
able to do anything to rectify it, this individual
had gone bankrupt and drawn out a large por-
tion of his money, approximately 80 percent,
and had done only about 25 or 30 percent of
the work.
This is where our problem lies, in the enforce-
ment of this law. We have to see that the Labor
Department gets on top of it, because the pro-
blems that exist out there in the market have
to be corrected, and Davis-Bacon provides that
correction only if it is enforced.4
The current focus by the Secretary of Labor, the
legislators, and the scholars, on the economics of the Act,
is a misplaced one which disregards the purpose of the Act.
By enacting the Davis-Bacon Act, Congress demonstrated
that it preferred a wage floor for workers rather than a
reduction of government expenses.42 Failure to enforce this
wage floor completely disregards Congressional intent.
One final word remains on whom the Act is designed
to protect. A commonly held perception is that the Davis-
Bacon Act, because it is supported by organized labor, is
merely a pro-union piece of legislation.43 While it is true
that union workers reap the benefit of the wage protections,
union contractors are able to avoid competing at a disad-
vantage because of it and this concededly reduces pressure
to look for non-union contractors, the Act provides impor-
tant safeguards to all workers regardless of their union
status. Indeed workers who are not unionized perhaps are
in greater need of its protections because they can not turn
to a union for protection. Among unionized contractors,
wage cutting practices are constrained by the requirements
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of collective bargaining agreements which contain specified
wage rates. Among non-union employers, however, there
are no such restraints. 44 Thus, while the Davis-Bacon Act
protects the livelihood of union employees, it is also a very
effective wage protection for construction workers who do
not have the benefit of union representation and negotiated
work agreements.
II. ORIGINS OF THE DAVIS-BACON ACT
AND ITS CURRENT RELEVANCE
A. Statutory History
The Davis-Bacon Act, like most early federal labor
laws, was preceded by state statutes. By the time the
original Davis-Bacon Act became federal law in 1931,
seven states had already enacted prevailing wage statutes
for construction work performed under contracts let by
those states. Kansas was the first state to do so, adopting
its statute in 1891.'- Prior to the 1930's, wages on federal
construction projects were lower than wages on local pro-
jects because federal agencies were required to award con-
tracts to the lowest bidder. 46 Contractors who took
advantage of growing unemployment by utilizing itinerant
laborers at lower wages underbid local contractors and thus
won the government contract.
.During the 1930's this problem became accentuated
because the federal government became engaged in signifi-
cant construction programs for public buildings throughout
the U.S.47 The Great Depression had generated armies of
jobless workers, with jobs so scarce that wage-cutting had
become a regular practice and national conscience was
aroused by the effect of widespread unemployment on the
wages of workers. The lower wage rates paid by ex-
ploitative contractors not only undermined the federal
building program but also led to labor strife and broken
contracts. Consequently, the Davis Bacon Act was pass-
ed to ensure that workers on federal projects would receive
a minimum wage based on local prevailing rates.
48
Representative Bacon said in the debate on the House bill:
A practice has been growing up in carrying out
the building program where certain itinerant, ir-
responsible contractors, with itinerant, cheap,
bootleg labor, have been going around the
country "picking" off a contract here and a con-
tract there, and local labor and the local con-
tractors have been standing on the sidelines
looking in. Bitterness has been caused in many
communities because of this situation.
This bill ... is simply to give local labor and
the local contractor a fair opportunity to par-
ticipate in this building program.49
In 1931 the building trades were the most strongly
organized group in the labor m6vement and their support
played a part in the Act's passage. Yet it is by no means
true that their support was the only or even the key reason
for the Act's passage.50 It must be remembered that it was
Republicans, not Democrats (the so called allies of organiz-
ed labor) who sponsored the Act and that they were as
much concerned with the stability of the construction
industry-" as with the level of wages to be paid to construc-
tion workers. 2
The bill which became law in 1939 was a very limited
measure and bears only slight resemblance to the statute
in its present form; it did not provide for predetermination
of prevailing wages by the Secretary and it did not establish
any enforcement mechanisms. In response to the
widespread evasion of the 1931 Act, Congress conducted
hearings on the topic in 1932 and 193453 which resulted
in the amendment of 193514 and also the Copeland "Anti-
Kickback" Act of 1934.-" The 1935 amendment required
that the Secretary of Labor predetermine wages and
ultimately led to Labor's promulgation of the prevailing
wage regulations.5 6 The Copeland Act made it a federal
crime to induce workers to pay back the income ensured
by the establishment of a prevailing wage.
The other significant amendment was enacted in 1964
in response to the changing pattern of wage payments.5 7
By this time fringe benefits had become a large portion of
the compensation received by the workers. Yet, the labor
force of a local community could continue to lose govem-
ment contracts to competitors who were able to underbid
them by denying their workers fringe benefits. 8 The effect
of the amendment was to require wage determinations to
specify not only locally prevailing hourly rates of pay, but
also locally prevailing fringe benefits expressed as hourly
rates.
B. The Davis-Bacon Act and the Modern Era
The theory behind the passage of the Davis-Bacon Act
is as valid today as it was when the original law was pass-
ed. Despite the many changes that have occurred since the
1930's, the driving down of wages continues to be a par-
ticular danger in construction, because labor is still likely
to be the only element of cost over which an employer can
exercise any degree of short-term control.5 9
Furthermore, "[t]o say that this law is obsolete or to
say that it is anachronistic is to ignore the reality of the
construction industry and the lives of the workers in it."
60
Inherent conditions in the construction industry make
Davis-Bacon more needed today than ever before. Con-
struction work is seasonal, hazardous and subject to an
extensive amount of downtime due to adverse weather con-
ditions and industrial controversy. Most workers in con-
struction move from project to project and are unemployed
between projects. Consequently, at any one point in time
there is usually a large pool of jobless workers.
Construction is not the prime source of wage and
salary employment for many of the individuals who work
in the industry. 6' About one-third of the construction
workers find employment in the industry for only one of
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the four quarters in the year and more than one fourth of
the industry's total work force earn more of their annual
income in some other industry. The construction industry
typically has an unemployment rate twice the national
average and this high rate of unemployment subjugates the
construction worker to a greater likelihood of exploitation.
62
One union official noted that his members worked an
average of 1200 hours this year (equivalent of 3/5 of the
hours of a full time worker), which is a number higher than
usual. 63 So although hourly construction wages are high,
annual earnings are low, lower in fact than those of their
counterparts in substantially all other industries except retail
trade and services.
64
Another unique feature of the construction industry is
its large number of small employers, a situation which
engenders fierce competition. According to the Small
Business Administration, in 1984 approximately fifty-seven
percent of all construction employees worked in firms
employing less than fifty persons. 65 The low capital re-
quirements for entry into the industry, often only a set of
tools, allows the individual entrepreneur to hire a few
workers and form his or her own company. 66 Thus, it is
clear that the need for Davis-Bacon arises out of the nature
of the construction industry itself and not the prevailing
economic conditions.
III. VIOLATIONS OF THE DAVIS-BACON ACT
A. Nature And Extent of Violations
The above section illustrates why violations of the
Davis- Bacon Act still occur at persistent and high rates
in the construction industry. Among the most common
forms of abuse of the Act are the following:
Kickback Practices: Despite the presence of the
Copeland 'Anti-Kickback" Act 67 workers are still being forc-
ed to kickback part of their wages to obtain or retain a job
or to reduce the legally required wage which the workers
must receive through Davis-Bacon protections .68
Payroll Falsification and Manipulation of Work
Hours: Employers, aware of the Act's requirements 69 in
this respect, reduce, on the payroll records, the number of
hours that employees worked. A worker whose prevailing
wage is determined to be $20.00 per hour and who works
a full forty hour week should be paid $800.00. Instead, an
employer may pay this worker $400.00 and write in on
the payroll records that this worker only worked 20 hours
that week. Thus, the amount the worker was paid
($400.00) and the amount the payroll indicates they were
paid comports. But the worker is being cheated out of half
his or her salary.
Manipulation of work hours also frequently occurs
when a worker participates in two separate projects for one
contractor. Many times these tvo projects will be let by
two separate federal agencies and thus the payroll records
will be kept separately, each by the respective federal agen-
cies involved in the project. If the worker puts in 35 hours
for one project during a week, and 20 hours on the other
project during that same week, s/he should be receiving
15 hours in overtime pay (hours worked in excess of 40
hours per week) and the payroll records should reflect this.
However, since the payroll records for the different pro-
jects are kept separately and never inspected together, there
is no way to determine that overtime is being worked.70
Diversion of Fringe Benefit Payments: As enforce-
ment agents get wiser so do the contractors, who always
try and remain one step ahead of the game. Thus, blatant
falsification of documents has become less frequent and
abusing the fringe benefits packages has become more
prevalent." Fringe benefits are easily concealable in the
construction industry because of workers' mobility and
failure of the DOL to require contractors to specify fringe
benefit packages being purchased for the workers. Often
these payments are not made to the appropriate fund, or
are put into an annuity that a worker cannot get to.
Misclassification of Workers: A major source of
present-day violations continues to involve workers who
are paid at the rate for one craft while doing the work of
a different, higher paid craft.7 2 Since the prevailing wage
for different crafts in a single locale can vary as much as
$15.00 per hour, willful misclassification can cheat a worker
out of great sums of money.
A case arising out of the construction of a brick train-
ing building at the Trident Submarine Base in Kings Bay,
Georgia is a good example of this sort of violation. In 1985
the Navy let this three year contract to Blake Construc-
tion Company for $96.3 million. On August 13, 1985 the
Heavy and Highway Committee made a Freedom of In-
formation Act request to the Department of the Navy for
certified payroll records submitted by Blake. Review of the
certified payrolls revealed that there was outright
misclassification of workers resulting in thousands of
dollars in wage underpayment. For example, in one pay
period there were twenty-four bricklayers, paid at the rate
of $10.00 an hour, to twenty-eight mason tenders, paid
at the rate of $5.00 an hour, according to the predeter-
mined rate. Mason tenders assist bricklayers on the job.
"There is no situation in the construction of a brick building
as is being built at the Trident Submarine Base that the
number of mason tenders would equal or exceed the
number of bricklayers. Indeed, most commonly, the ratio
is one mason tender to each two bricklayers. Thus, it is
readily apparent from the certified payroll reports submit-
ted by Blake that the people classified as mason tenders
were in fact doing bricklayers' work and should have been
paid at the $10.00 rate rather than the $5.00 rate of a
mason tender."
7 3
Similarly, a contractor can classify a skilled worker as
an apprentice or trainee and thus claim s/he is not entitled
to the prevailing rate. The regulations set forth that an ap-
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prentice or trainee can be paid less than the prevailing wage
only if s/he is enrolled in a bona fide training program.74
The purpose behind this program is to insure an ongoing
pool of skilled workers and to protect workers from being
forever destined to low paying, dead end jobs. Many con-
tractors take advantage of this category by paying workers
at a lower rate while they receive no real training. One com-
mentator recounts the testimony, before Congress, of the
Office of Navajo Labor Relations describing how Navajos
had been victimized in this precise manner because the
Davis-Bacon "apprenticeship" regulations were not being
enforced on the Navajo Reservation. "Our 1973 investiga-
tion of such programs indicated that these programs were
mainly designed to create a cheap labor force for the con-
tractor. As an example, one contractor set up a six month
program and paid the Navajos $2.25 per hour, then he end-
ed the training programs after six months and laid off the
trainees on grounds that the journeymen workforce was
sufficient."75
B. Statistical Information Regarding
Violations and A Concrete Example
According to DOL statistics (cited above) 2,222 of the
2,892 investigations undertaken in fiscal year 1988 resulted
in findings of violations with $14,972,798 being recovered
in back wages for 17,513 employees. 6 It should be noted
that this $14 million figure represents the amount contrac-
tors agreed to pay in back wages - i.e. the settlement
figure- not the amount actually due. And since many
violators are never caught, it is safe to assume that this
figure represents only a portion of the amount unlawfully
withheld from workers.
A concrete example of a Davis-Bacon violator is useful
in highlighting enforcement problems and the regularity with
which these violations occur. The example of Janik Pav-
ing & Construction Inc.77 is particularly enlightening
because it culminated in a Court of Appeals case challeng-
ing the debarment order.
Janik Paving has been primarily engaged in the
highway paving and construction business in and around
Buffalo since 1979. Most of the projects Janik has been
involved in received federal funding. 8 In 1980, Janik was
awarded two contracts that obligated it to pay the laborers
and mechanics it employed on these contracts the wages
prevailing for similar construction in the same localities.
7 9
Local 17, of the International Union of Operating
Engineers, through questioning the employees, uncovered
a number of infractions of the prevailing rate laws in over-
time payments, including questionable fringe deductions,8 °
which enabled Janik to compete unfairly with union con-
tractors. A complaint was filed with the New York State
Labor Department for the Western District of N.Y., whose
investigative staff for Davis-Bacon violations include four
field investigators, one senior' investigator and one
secretary. 8 Violations were uncovered and $3,213.45 was
originally withheld and later settled for the sum of $1400.
A complaint for the same time period was filed with
the U.S. Department of Labor for the Western District of
N.Y. The investigative staff at this office totals thirteen,
but in addition to Davis-Bacon violations these officers In-
vestigate various federal labor standards laws.2 Between
February and June of 1981, the Wage & Hour Division
investigated Janik's performance by inspecting payroll
records and employee time cards, and interviewing past
and present employees. Based on these findings the Divi-
sion concluded that certain employees had not been paid
overtime rates and that certain payroll records were
falsified. 3 On May 9, 1983, Janik was notified that they
would be debarred from future federally-sponsored work
and on May 25 Janik requested an administrative hearing.
8 4
More than two years later an evidentiary hearing was
held before an administrative law judge during which one
of Janik's former employees, Richard Pollard,
testified that he visited Janik's offices at one
point to ask about his hours and discovered
that the timecards Janik had maintained on him
were not the same as those he had submitted
and that the hours on Janik's timecards were
different from those he had reported. Pollard
stated William Janik then telephoned and in-
dicated that he would discharge him if he turn-
ed Janik in to the Department of Labor!8
The Administrative Law Judge found that Janik's violations
were willful, debarred the company for a two year period,
and ordered Janik to pay back wages to specified
employees.8 6 After unsuccessfully appealing to the DOL's
Wage Appeals Board, Janik commenced an action to
preliminarily enjoin the implementation of the debarment
order in federal district court for the Western District of
N.Y.. The action was dismissed and on appeal the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the ALJ's
holding."
IV. ENFORCING THE DAVIS-BACON ACT:
A CALL FOR CHANGE
The above example highlights the nature and extent
to which workers are being cheated out of money which
is rightfully theirs.8 8 Solutions to enforcement problems
need to be found and implemented immediately. The
following is an outline of some possible changes that could
be undertaken to ensure greater complicity with the Act.
A. Statutory Changes
Legislation to Protect "Whistleblowing"
Workers: Due to the regulatory allocation of Davis-Bacon
enforcement and the cutback in staff at the various DOL
offices, 9 almost all investigations by DOL are currently
reactive, undertaken in response to complaints, instead of
mandatory routine investigations. This method of enforce-
ment means that the onus is on the worker to activate the
enforcement mechanisms. And although the DOL keeps
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information confidential, workers are often asked to testify
(as in the Janik example) or submit written affidavits. In
an industry that is no newcomer to corruption, greed and
blacklisting,9" statutory protection of workers who lodge
complaints and initiate investigations needs to be built in
to the Davis-Bacon Act.
There are several federal statutes that protect both
private and public sector employees who disclose informa-
tion or engage in sanctioned activities, 91 and numerous
state statutes have recently been enacted specifically to pro-
mote employee disclosure of information that would lead
to correcting or preventing violations of law. These federal
laws vary in the activities they protect and the manner in
which allegations of reprisal are investigated and ad-
judicated. 92 The statutory protections often appear as an
appendage to an underlying substantive regulatory program
rather than as the result of efforts to structure comprehen-
sive employee protections. 93 Such an appendage to the
regulatory program of the Davis-Bacon Act is sorely
needed.
Legislation of this kind could not only make it a crime
to harass or blacklist such employees, but might also pro-
vide for temporary financial support and/or job training for
a worker who is no longer able to maintain his livelihood
in this industry because of blacklisting. Unlike most other
industiies, reinstatement and/or promotion would not be
available since construction jobs are short-lived. One law
review commentator concisely summed up the benefits and
purposes of such legislation:
The object of protecting whistleblowers is to en-
courage them to have a personal investment in
the enforcement of laws and in the integrity of
their organizations. Whistleblower are an aid
in enforcing statutes and in furthering public
policy; it is conceivable that the very existence
of whistleblower protections is an incentive that
encourages employers to comply with laws,
rules, and other standards of conduct. The
likelihood that an employee will make the per-
sonal investment to blow the whistle will in-
crease if the threat of retaliation or reprisal is
reduced.
94
Stiffer Criminal Penalties: Fines and the possibility
of debarment are not sufficient deterrents to violators.
Often times the penalty for violators does not amount to
a hardship because the only result is that the contractor
has to make remuneration. Thus, s/he is no worse off if
s/he violates the law and gets caught, a problem which is
in no way unique to Davis-Bacon violations but which is
a pervasive problem in worker protection statutes. 95
Although the Copeland "Anti-Kickback" Act provides
that weekly payroll forms are subject to the criminal code,96
this language is not strong enough. The law should explicit-
ly provide that whoever induces another to give up his en-
titled wages in any way shall face criminal charges, including
imprisonment. Accompanying this statutory change should
be the increased effort to impose criminal penalties, rather
than just civil, upon those who violate the Act. Unfortunate-
ly, criminal prosecutions for these violations, as well as
violations under other worker protection statutes, are
unusual. A study by the GAO of DOL's Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act (FLSA) enforcement practices (undertaken by
the same division which is responsible for the Davis-Bacon
Act) indicates that regional directors in at least four regions
could not recall having filed a criminal suit under the Act
in more than ten years. 97 This trend must be reversed. In
support of this change is the information intimated by of-
ficials at both the federal and state DOL regarding the
noticeable "chilling effect" the imposition of a jail sentence
for violators had on other contractors.9"
B. Regulatory Changes
Payroll Records: Due to the prevalence of payroll
falsification and the manipulation of work hours, a require-
ment that payroll records contain more detailed informa-
tion is necessary. Requiring that carbon-copy time cards
signed by employees, noting when work began and when
work ended for each day of employment, be kept on file
(one with the federal agency, the other with the worker)
would also be another safeguard against abuse. However,
any additional paperwork requirements are sure to come
under a crossfire of criticism as adding to an already cost-
ly program. The paperwork requirements of the Act are
one of its most vulnerable points for attack, prompting
William Brock, former Secretary of the DOL, to state before
a Congressional committee: "I really do think that weekly
reporting requirement is not only onerous but unnecessary
and, frankly, a waste of time and energy. We don't do
anything with those reports except file them. There really
is no value to that kind of process other than in use of
warehouse space, which the taxpayers have to pay for. I
think it's ridiculous."9 9 However, the FLSA contains recor-
ding requirements almost identical to the Davis-Bacon Act,
and like Davis-Bacon, requires the retention of payroll
records for three years.' Thus government construction
contractors will not be relieved of their obligation to main-
tain and preserve payroll records for three years even if the
Davis-Bacon did not contain these requirements. In addi-
tion, the failure of DOL to make use of these records
highlights DOL's lax enforcement, rather than the record's
uselessness. "Generalized recordkeeping requirements can
provide an alternative means by which agencies can en-
sure the availability of information for potential enforcement
action, as well as a means to check the accuracy of any
reports filed with the agency."' 0' In the words of one labor
official: "[f]or the Department of Labor to concede that
these agencies do not conduct systematic reviews of these
reports is nothing less than an admission that enforcement
of the law is a sham."0 2 Despite the reasons for better
recordkeeping, it is still unlikely that an administration so
bent on "cost savings" would adopt this additional, albeit
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important, paperwork requirement.
To detect the more subtle problem engendered when
one employee simultaneously works two projects for a
single contractor, payroll forms should specify wages earn-
ed for the particular job and then total hours and wages
earned by that employee for that week. This requirement
would cut down on the problem of "hidden overtime".
Ending Dual Enforcement: The transfer of primary
responsibility for monitoring and enforcing the Act from
the federal procurement agency to the DOL would have
a major impact on the enforcement problems plaguing the
Act. It is the DOL staff which has the expertise to in-
vestigate violations.' 0 3 The personnel at the various con-
tracting agencies often have no great interest in enforcing
the law on their respective projects. It is not only that they
do not attach a high priority to the administrative needs
of Davis-Bacon, but they also tend to look at the Act as
a barrier to their acceptance of the lowest bid. The con-
tracting agency concerned with minimizing its own costs
on a federal construction project is not the most likely par-
ticipant to safeguard the rights of laborers and mechanics
because the requirement to pay prevailing wages increases
those costs. This conflict of interest has been described
by one author as a situation in which "the home team not
only plays its own baseball game, but umpires as well."'0 4
Of course, placing all the enforcement responsibilities
in the hands of the DOL would require increasing its in-
vestigative staff. The current ninety-four full time in-
vestigative officers working on Davis-Bacon 0 5 would not
be a sufficient number to handle an increased enforcement
effort. It would cost quite a bit to increase the staff at DOL;
however, in the long term there would be monetary sav-
ings since the federal government is currently losing millions
of dollars to contractors cheating workers. If Davis-Bacon
was enforced these millions would be in the hands of
workers - who would no longer need public assistance,
unemployment benefits, etc. - and returned to the com-
munities in which they live. "[W]hen you have prevailing
rates that provide benefits, it provides the construction
worker with health and welfare pension and training, and
the result is that the worker who gets these benefits
becomes a net contributor to the community and to the
Government rather than a net user. If a person does not
get these benefits they ultimately have to go to the Federal
Government."' 0 6 The Davis-Bacon Act "affects not just
costs but also, the lives of many hundreds of thousands
of American workers and affects their wages, and that in
turn, affects the economic lives of not only their families
but their communities as well. So this issue goes beyond
a matter of mere bookkeeping, accounting, or paperwork,
and indeed it touches the lives of millions of Americans."'
0 7
C. Other Changes
Educating Workers About the Davis-Bacon Act:
Since much of the initiative for investigations now comes
from worker's complaints and union investigations' 0 8 rather
than mandatory routine investigations, it is imperative that
workers understand the protections afforded to them under
the Davis-Bacon Act. In addition, workers need to be
educated as to how contractors falsify documents so they
can catch it themselves, and they must be encouraged to
keep their own records of hours worked. An education pro-
gram of this sort can be undertaken by the various unions
in the building and construction trades. However, such a
program would not reach non-union workers who, because
they lack union protection and collective bargaining
agreements, are in great need of this information.
Access to Payroll Records and Disclosure of File
Material: As was stated above, in many locales, it is the
building trades unions and committees jointly funded by
unions and contractors who are currently responsible for
discovering many Davis-Bacon violations.10 9 In monitor-
ing compliance with the Act, union locals, intimately
knowledgeable as to the contractors likely to be cheating
in their locale, request copies of certified weekly payroll
reports filed by contractors through the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act (FOIA). 110
Several years ago, however, it became apparent that
many local unions were being denied copies of certified
payroll reports from the federal agencies which held them
on file . " This trend eventually led to a 1984 district court
case originating in Buffalo, N.Y.' 12 The court held that cer-
tified weekly payroll reports were subject to disclosure under
FOIA because the union was seeking information to pro-
tect wages and fringe benefits, which its members presently
received, from unlawful competition, thus outweighing any
personal privacy interest which the employees might have
against disclosure of income from a job. 3 After a Court
of Appeals decision summarily affirmed the District Court
opinion," 4 many agencies have reconsidered their posi-
tion concerning release of certified payroll reports, but other
agencies have not been so accommodating. In particular,
HUD (the subject of the 1984-85 litigation) continues to
resist compliance with the IBEW Local 41 precedent. ' "
In cases denying similar requests for certified payroll
reports, unions are forced to withstand delays and at-
tomey's fees in exhausting administrative avenues. Once
these avenues are exhausted, they are forced to file suit,
thereby incurring unnecessary litigation expenses and fur-
ther delays. Eventually, the requesting party (union) is vin-
dicated and the federal government is forced to pay
reasonable attorneys' fees. Such a process is costly to the
unions, the federal government and the taxpayers, and is
counterproductive since all the unions are seeking to do
is supplement the federal government's enforcement of the
Davis-Bacon Act. A mechanism to ensure that the con-
tracting agency immediately releases the requested payroll
information to the unions (either through a regulation,
stated policy or an expedited administrative procedure) is
needed. This is especially so considering that the unions
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can not gain access to contractor's records in any other
manner. Even if the DOL has undertaken an investigation
or is monitoring compliance on a particular project and in
their authority have demanded company records, including
payrolls, such records can not be shared with the unions.
Currently, under regulation 5.6(a)(4), none of the material
from the investigatory files of the DOL may be disclosed
to anyone other than Federal officials charged with ad-
ministering the contract.
'1 6
Disclosing such information to unions and joint labor-
management groups investigating compliance with Davis-
Bacon would surely lead to more violators being caught.
However, there is a danger in allowing unions greater ac-
cess to company records and file material: unions should
not shoulder the responsibility for enforcing this Act. Aside
from the problem of allowing unions to "police" federal laws,
investigations require time, resources and costs to unions
(often lacking in all three) that should be borne by the
government. "While all of these organizations should be
congratulated for their effort, the fact remains that private
groups are providing funding to do a job that the Depart-
ment of Labor and procuring agencies are required by law
to do." 1 7 Thus, allowing unions greater access to contrac-
tors and the DOL's records must be done, if at all, with
the understanding that this access does not get the federal
government "off the hook" in their enforcement duties.
Judicial Review of Enforcement Activities: One
modification to the administrative procedures, suggested
by one law review commentator in 1980, that would en-
sure consistent and uniform enforcement was an express
grant of judicial review of enforcement activities. 1 8
However, given the outcome of a 1985 Federal Circuit case,
the likelihood of this occurring in the near future seems ex-
tremely slim. In Unity Bank & Trust Co. v. United States,"9
the Federal Circuit held that the Davis-Bacon Act did not
require the DOL to investigate contractors' wage reports
to ascertain whether a contractor was paying statutorily
mandated wages, and failure to do so did not breach any
duty to Unity Bank. 120 The case involved a contract entered
into by a painting contractor who took out a loan from Uni-
ty Bank to finance the project and as security for the loan
assigned to Unity Bank its right to payment under the con-
tract.12' After employees filed a complaint alleging they had
not received the prevailing minimum wage, an investiga-
tion revealed that employees had indeed been underpaid.' 22
The government withheld final payments on the contract
and Unity Bank filed suit to recover the amount of withheld
funds.' 2 3 The court held that enforcement of provisions of
Davis-Bacon did not require a higher degree of monitoring
where the DOL issued its first withholding request seven
weeks after receipt of complaints that the contractor was
not paying employees the prevailing wage.124 The court
concluded that all that was required was sufficient investiga-
tion as necessary to assure compliance, a decision which
rests with the agency.
125
And therein lies the problem. Leaving monitoring and
investigation requirements up to the discretion of the federal
agency, whose interests often are antithetical to those of
the workers, 26 is virtually rolling out the red carpet to
violators. Leaving the determination of whether and when
to conduct an investigation of a contractor's compliance
with the prevailing wage provision to the discretion of the
federal agency, as the court did, perpetuates already incon-
sistent and insufficient enforcement. Granting judicial
review of the procurement agencies and the DOL's enforce-
ment activities would ensure more uniform and more
stringent enforcement.
In reaching its conclusion the Court stated that "[t]he
mandatory and routine investigation that Unity Bank's posi-
tion would require the DOL and the agencies to conduct
would creat6 an impossible administrative burden in light
of the thousands of federal construction contracts that are
being performed at any one time."' 27 However, the failure
to undertake these mandatory routine investigations cur-
rently creates a tremendous burden on thousands of
workers and their families who are being cheated out of
millions of dollars for which they worked. Why individual
workers should be forced to bear the cost of this burden,
rather than the federal government, was not explained by
the judge.
V. CONCLUSION
The Davis-Bacon Act is an early example of federal
involvement in social legislation. Like most social legisla-
tion it involves a major administrative undertaking and thus
substantial costs. What the judge in Unity Bank, Labor
Secretaries Donovan and Brock, the legislature and various
academics and scholars fail to understand is that to ade-
quately protect construction workers from the wage cut-
ting inherent in the construction industry, these costs must
be borne. Their economic analysis does not account for
the Act's contribution to social welfare.' 28 The purpose of
the Davis-Bacon Act is to protect the wages of construc-
tion workers even if the effect is to increase the costs of
construction to the federal government. Representative
Williams summed up this point most eloquently when he
stated before a Congressional Committee:
It seems to me that Davis-Bacon almost
[always], no matter how efficiently it is ad-
ministered, is going to have one effect or the
other [increasing wages, or increasing the
Federal deficit]. I would come down on the side
of saying let's weight it towards a slight uplif-
ting of wages rather than allowing it to depress
wages. It isn't designed to do either, but we're
all only human we can only administer the act,
and we're really better to fall on the side of in-
creasing wages for Americans than we are
decreasing wages for Americans.
1 29
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Without a willingness to bear this administrative cost, we
are faced with the current situation - a failure to adequately
safeguard workers from exploitation.
ENDNOTES
1 40 U.S.C. 276 et seq. (1982).
2 The Davis-Bacon Act was the first federal wage law which pro-
vided wage protection to non-government workers. There were no general
minimum wage laws, no federal unemployment compensation and no
NLRA at the time of its enactment. Elisberg, Wage Protection Under the
Davis-Bacon Act 28 Lab. L. J. 323, 323 (1977).
3 40 U.S.C. 276a(a).
4 See 29 C.F.R. 5.1 (1988) for a compilation of statutes containing
Davis-Bacon provisions.
5 In addition there are counties throughout the country which have
local ordinances mirroring the Davis-Bacon Act. These "micro Davis-
Bacon" Acts are bound to become more common as state prevailing wage
statutes are repealed or weakened. See infra note 21 and accompanying
text. The first county to enact a local prevailing wage law where no state
version existed was Broward County, Florida in 1983 following the repeal
of Florida's Davis-Bacon Act, Fla. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, sec. 215.19 (1933),
in 1979. For an excellent discussion of the campaign to adopt this coun-
ty law see, Fine, Orgonizing For Prevailing Wage in Florida 12 Lab. Res.
Rev. 71 (1988).
6 40 U.S.C.276a(a).
7 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C 151 [Findings and Policies]
"The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not
possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and
employers who are organized in the coporate or other forms of owner-
ship association substantialy burdens and affects the flow of commerce,
and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by
depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage
earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of
competitive wage rates and working conditions within and
between industries." Id. (emphasis added).
8 United States v. Binghamton Construction Co., 347 U.S. 171,
178 (1954); Walsh v Schlect, 429 U.S. 401,411 (1977); Universities
Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 771 (1981).
9 29 C.F.R. 1 (1988). Administrative responsibilities for the Act were
placed within the Employment Standards Administration on July 1,1969
pursuant to Labor Secretary's Order 24-69.
10 "By tradition, each craft has been carefully defined and union craft-
smen have been zealous in protecting the integrity of their respective skill
areas against fragmentation and dilution. In union shop construction, such
matters are normally arranged through labor management agreements."
Warner, Congressional and Administrative Efforts to Modify or Eliminate
the Davis-Bacon Act, 10 W. St. L. Rev. 1 (1982).
11 29 C.F.R. 1.2(a) (1988). Prior to the 1982 regulatory changes
this section read as follows
(1) The rate of wages paid in the area in which the work
is to be performed, to the majority of those employed in
that classification in construction in the area similar to the
proposed undertaking; (2) In the event that there is not a
majority paid at the same rate, then the rate paid to the
greater number; Provided such greater number constitutes
30 percent of those employed; or (3) In the event that less
than 30 percent of those employed receive the same rate,
the average rate.
12 29 C.F.R. 1.3 (1988)
13 See, e.g., Walsh, Labor and the Law (White Paper: Organized
Labor) 6 Gov't Union Rev. 23, 25 (1985).
The willingness of the Department of Labor to favor unions
in the administration of Davis-Bacon is a consequence of
practical and political consideration, not economic ones.
... Still the implementation of the Davis-Bacon law remains
largely an expression of the parochial interest of organiz-
ed labor. Organized labor's view on federal contracting Is
that unionized construction workers, paid at union levels
should be employed on federal projects.
See also Schooner, The Davis-Bacon Act: Controversial Implementation
of the 50 Percent Rule, 10 Empl. Rel. L. J. 702, 713 (1985). uCon-
tinued adherence to the Act's requirements serves only union Interests
at the taxpayers expense." Id.
14 Nat'l Joint Heavy and Highway Construction Comm., 2 Heavy
& Highway News (June 1986) reprinted in Oversight Hearings on the
Davis-Bacon Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor Standards
of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess.
371-74 (1986) [hereinafter Oversight Hearings]. See also, Allen, Much
Ado About Davis-Bacon: A Critical Review and New Evidence, 26 J.
L. & Eco. 707 (1983). In examining whether there exists a bias towards
using union rates, Allen used a sample which contained a total of 1029
observations of union and Davis-Bacon wages for seven different occupa-
tion across 167 determinations covering 77 SMSA's. "in summary, the
results indicate that the selection of union versus nonunion rates In Davis-
Bacon area determination is sensitive to percent union." Id. at 724.
15 "Union membership in the construction industry in the 1930's
and 40's was extremely high, and in the 1950's it represented 80% of
the workforce. Since then, unionization has declined quite significantly,
to where it was estimated at 23.4% in 1986." Levine, Prehire Agreements
and Doublebreasting in the Construction Industry: Prospects for Legislative
Change 39 Lab. L. J. 247 (1988).
16 See 29 C.F.R. 5.6(a)(3) (1988). "The federal agency shall cause
such investigations to be made as may be necessary to assure compliance
with the labor standards clauses required by Sec. 5.5.... See also 29
C.F.R 5.5(a)(2). "The (write in name of Federal Agency or the loan or
grant recipient) shall ... withhold ... from the contractor.., so much
accrued payments or advances as may be considered necessary to pay
laborers and mechanics ... the full amount of wages required by the con-
tract." But see infra note 104 and accompanying text.
17 29 C.F.R. 5.6(b) (1988)
18 40 U.S.C. 276a-2 ["Payment of wages by Comptroller General
from Withheld Payments; Listing Contractors Violating Contracts.l.
19 29 C.F.R. 5.12 (1988).
20 Fine, supra note 5, at 71.
21 Thiebolt, Prevailing Wage Laws of the States, 4 Gov't Union
Rev. 1 (1983).
22 See, e.g., S. 1535 and H.R. 2648, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1986). (Bills to raise the thresholds for coverage under Davis-Bacon from
$2000 to $100,000 for nonmilitary contracts and to 1,000,000 for military
contracts. For a concise discussion of some of the various bills propos-
ed, see generally Warner, supra note 10.
23 "[I]n late 1987 [HUD] issued a proposed regulation which would
specifically preclude public housing authorites from applying state prevaling
wage law to housing projects. New York was one of five states that join-
ed with the Building Trades Council in publicly urging HUD to withdraw
the regulation. A final rule is expected to be issued soon." Attorney General,
N.Y. State Dep't of Law, Prevailing Wage Update.
24 See, e.g., GAO Rep. The Davis-Bacon Act Should Be Repeal-
ed, HRD-7918 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office 1979).
The major conclusions of the report are that significant changes in
economic conditions and in worker protection laws since the Depression
have negated the laws original purpose; the Act is Impractical, If not Im-
possible, to administer. A. Thiebolt, The Davis-Bacon Act (1975);
Goldfarb & Morrall, Cost Implications of Changing Davis-Bacon Ad-
ministration 4 Poly Analysis 439 (1978); Gould, The Economics of
the Davis-Bacon Act (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise In-
stitute, 1971); N.Y. Times, May 4, 1981 at 22, col. 1; Mainland, Prevail-
ing Wages, America (1986).
25 44 Fed. Reg. 77,026 (1979).
QQ IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
I
26 See Goldfarb & Morrall, The Davis-Bacon Act: An Appraisal of
Recent Studies, 34 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 191, 205 (1981).
27 47 Fed. Reg. 23,544-79.
28 See e.g., Capuano, Davis-Bacon, ERISA and MPAA - Impact
in Construction Industry, 1982 Constr. Indus. Lab. Rel.: Prac. L.
Inst. 165, 169. '"hose regulations accomplished what Congress had
declined to do less than a month before the regulations were drafted -
they effectively repealed the Davis-Bacon Act . . ." Id.
29 See Summary of Final Regulatory Impact and Regulatory Flex-
ibility Analysis, 47 Fed. Reg. 23,647-48 (1982). "The final revisions
discussed above, in conjunction with the changes to Part 5 of the Davis-
Bacon rules ... will result in substantial cost savings annually of $585
million for both contractors and the government while still assuring pro-
tection of local wage rates and practices." Id.
30 "[T]he Secretary must articulate a reason bearing some relation-
ship to the statutory purpose to support his new interpretation of that
statute. The Secretary's recitation of tenuously supported projections of
cost savings is not persuasive. Cost and cost savings are not only irrele-
vant to the statutes purpose, but those very same cost considerations
were rejected by Congress." Capuano, supra note 28 at 175. See also
Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 426 (1970) for an articulation of the
Secretary's burden. ("The secretary cannot 'adopt a regulation that bears
no relationship to any recognized concept of [the issue] or that would
defeat the purpose of the ..- program.")
31 Building & Constr. Trades' Dept. v. Donovan, 543 F. Supp. 1282
(D.D.C. 1982).
32 Building & Constr. Trades' Dept. v. Donovan, 553 F. Supp 352
(D.D.C. 1982).
33 Building & Constr. Trades' Dept. v. Donovan 712 F. 2d 611 (D.C.
Cir. 1983). See generally, Roberts, Labor Law - The Davis Bacon Act,
Another Setback for Labor: Building & Construction Trades'Department
v. Donovan, 10 J. Corp. Law 277 (1984).
However, the injuction remained in effect as to the use of helpers
despite approval of other Davis-Bacon revisions. On January 27, 1989,
the Labor Department issued a final rule in the Federal Register, 54 Fed.
Reg. 4224. The rule will be effective 60 days after the injuction against
certain provisions is lifted by the U.S. District Court. According to Terry
Yellig, AFL-CIO attorney, buidling trade unions opposed to a helper rule
in any form, will file suit to block the rule when it becomes effective. 130
Lab. Rel. Rep. 153 (Feb. 6, 1989).
34 104 S. Ct. 975 (1984).
35 The Reagan administration has consistently turned the other cheek
towards violations of the Davis-Bacon Act and other Federal statutes
designed to protect workers. They have managed to strip these statutes
of their effectiveness partially by cutting the staff and budget of the Depart-
ment of Labor, ensuring that investigations will be fewer and further be-
tween. A prime example of this is the only 1200 compliance officers for
OSHA who currently have responsibility for five million sites. Salem, Re-
cent Developments In the Law at the U.S. Department of Labor, 34 Inst.
on Lab. L., Sec. 8.03 (1988). The Department of Labor currently has
94 (number does not include support staff) compliance officers working
full time on Davis-Bacon investigations for the entire country. Telephone
interview with Bob Devore, U.S. Dept. of Labor in Washington D.C., Plan-
ning and Review Division (Nov. 18,1988). Cf. Interview with Skip Easterly,
Area Director, Wage and Hour Division, U.S. Dept. of Labor for the
W.D.N.Y (Sept. 1988) (The department is losing staff, good people are
retiring and the pay doesn't attract young people.') In addition it is
speculated that federal monies that might have been used to finance in-
vestigations of violations of Davis-Bacon and other worker-protection
statutes are now going towards financing investigations of unions. Inter-
view with Tom Hopkins, Field Representative, Local 17, International
Union of Operating Engineers (Nov. 4, 1988). But cf. statement made
by DOL official in Washington that the Reagan administration has not
asked us to cut back enforcement effoits. Interview with Bob Devore,
supra.
36 Reno, Job Safety Cry Has Deep Roots in Disasters, Newsday,
March 26, 1986 at 37.
37 Rothstein, A. Knapp, & L. Leibman, Employment Law
329 (1988). See also Nordlund, A Brief History of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act 39 Lab. L. J. 715, 727 "In the early years of the FLSA about
ten percent of covered establishments were investigated each year. In 1987,
about 2 percent of covered establishments were investigated."
38 Oversight Hearings supra note 14 at 22 (testimony of William
Brock).
39 Interview with Bob DeVore, supra note 35. See also infra note 76.
40 One commentator has noted that, "Officials estimate that the new
regulations will cause employees currently employed on federal projects
to accept lower wages, force journeymen craft employees currently
employed on federal projects to accept work at helper wages, or be replaced
by helpers, and allow nonunion contractors to squeeze union contrac-
tors out of government subsidized construction." Roberts, supra note 33,
at 289.
41 Oversight Hearings supra note 14 at 296 (testimony of Don
Mariutto. President of Mariutto & Sons, a tile and marble contracting firm
in Coral Gables, FL)
42 In passing the Davis-Bacon Act, the clear Congressional purpose
was to protect employees from substandard wages on federally funded
contracts. See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. There was no
intent to save federal funds nor to benefit contractors and the Supreme
Court explicitly recognized this in U.S. v. Binghamton Construction Co.,
347 U.S. 171, 176-77 (1954). See also Building & Constr. Trades' Dept.
v. Donovan, 543 F. Supp 1282, 1291 (D.D.C. 1982) ('The basic pur-
pose of the Davis-Bacon Act is to protect the wages of construction
workers even if the effect is to increase the costs of construction to the
federal government.")
43 See supra note 13.
44 Cf. Interview with Tom Hopkins supra note 35. (Mr. Hopkins
explained that all complaints he has received regarding Davis-Bacon viola-
tions have come from non-union workers since his union's members are
protected under collective bargaining agreements. Pursuit of these com-
plaints by unions do not arise out of a responsibility to non-union members
but rather out of a responsibility to all workers and to the construction
industry on the whole).
45 New York followed in 1897; Oklahoma in 1909; Idaho in 1911;
Arizona in 1912; N.J. in 1913 and Mass in 1914. See generally Johnson,
Prevailing Wage Legislation in the States, 8 Monthly Lab. Rev. 840
(1961).
46 10 U.S.C. 2304 (1982) "Purchase of and contracts for property
or services ... shall be made by formal advertising, and shall be award-
ed on a competitive bid basis to the lowest responsible bidder in all cases
in which the use of such method is feasible and practicable under the
existing conditions and circumstances."
47 "Passage of the Act was spurred by the economic conditions of
the early 1930's which gave rise to an oversupply of labor and increased
importance of federal building programs, since private construction was
limited." Universities Research Ass'n v Coutu 450 U.S. 754, 774 (1981).
48 For an interesting discussion of the history of the Act in which
it is argued that in adopting the prevailing wage concept Congress was
not taking a very aggressive position see A. Thiebolt, Prevailing
Wage Legislation 26 (Labor Relations and Public Policy Series No.
27) (1986)
But Congress did not have a free hand in choosing a wage
policy. It felt compelled to respect limitations with regard
to how far government could intrude into what, in 1931,
was still considered to be the private contract between
employers and employees. It seems clear that one of the
reasons that Davis-Bacon adopted the prevailing wage con-
cept was because prevailing wages offered a less stringent
requirement than a set wage, including a mandated
minimum wage.
49 Mr. Bacon continued:
I think that it is a fair proposition where the Government
is building these post offices and public buildings throughout
the country that the local contractor and local labor may
SPRING 1989 3
have a 'fair break' in getting the contract. If the local con-
tractor is successful in obtaining the bid, it means that local
labor will be employed, because that local contractor is going
to continue in business in that community after the work
is done. If an outside contractor gets the contract, and there
Is no discrimination against the honest contractor, it means
that he will have to pay the prevailing wages, just like the
local contractor.
74 Cong. Rec. 6510, Feb. 28 1931.
50 Contra Walsh, supra note 13, at 26. "'he key to passage of Davis-
Bacon was the support of the AFL, which endorsed the concept as soon
as it was introduced." Id.
51 With the market for private construction suffering through a period
of severe decline, the federal building program clearly was the major source
of stability for the Depression era construction industry. This argument
has continued validity in the context of today's market. "The Act helps
to maintain an adequate labor supply during periods of economic slowdown
thus avoiding inflationary bottlenecks during periods of recovery. When
there is an economic slowdown, the unemployment rate in the construc-
tion industry tends to rise to extremely high levels. Skilled labor will tend
to leave the construction labor force under these conditions. By assuring
the payment of at least locally prevailing wages, the Act thus helps the
construction industry to maintain the skilled labor supplies it requires under
normal conditions." Oversight Hearings, supra note 14 at 123 (prepared
statement of Robert A Georgine, President, Building and Constr. Trades
Dept., AFL-CIO).
52 An argument not as often leveled by critics of the Act, but one
which deserves some attention is that the Act's sponsors, in hoping to
prevent itinerant contractors from bidding on federal contracts were not
only attempting to protect local construction wage standards but were
also attempting to exclude blacks from those jobs. That is, some of the
resentment toward itinerant contractors employing migratory labor may
have been a subtle form of racism. See Schooner, supra note 13 at 705.
"Black workers imported from the South clearly earned more on federal
projects than at their earlier jobs. However, Congress had intended the
benefits of this relatively well-paying construction work to be realized
elsewhere."The support for this criticism lies with a statement made by
Congressman Allgood during the House debate on the bill in which he
referred to the contractors itinerant employees as "cheap colored labor"
noting that it was "labor of that sort which was in competition with white
labor throughout the country." 74 Cong Rec. 6513, Feb. 28, 1931. But
see Building & Constr. Trades' Dept., AFL-CIO, The Davis
Bacon Act: It Works to Build America, 60 (1979). "Whatever may have
been Congressman Bacon's original motives the fact is that by the time
Congress was ready to deal in earnest with the prevailing wage proposal
the problem was not considered to be one that was due exclusively to
itinerant Southern contractors and 'imported' labor, black or white." Id.
It is often argued by supporters of the Act that too much emphasis
has been placed on this reference by Congressman Allgood, since it is
the only time that such a sentiment occurs in the recorded hearings leading
up to the passage of the Act. However, in July 1985, in vetoing a measure
that would otherwise have repealed Lousiana's state prevaling wage law
the governor supported his actions by calling the prevailing wage law in
the state "the only process by which [Mexican and other aliens being
employed in local construction work] can be identified and remedial ac-
tions taken by administrative enforcement." A. Thieblot, supra note
48 at 30 quoting Prevailing Wage Repeal Fails in Louisiana, 31 Constr.
Lab. Rep. 485-86 (1985). Of course, the govemor's comments do not
imply that the act is an inherently racist one, but rather that unscrupulous
people can use it to further underlying racist policies.
53 Hearings on H.R. 12 Before The House Committee on Labor,
72 Cong. 1st Sess. 1673 (1932); Hearings On S. Res. 228 Before Senate
Subcommittee on Education and Labor, 73rd Cong, 2nd Sess. 233-34,
414. 428. 512-54 (1934).
54 Act of August 30, 1935, ch. 825 Sec. 1, 49 Stat. 1011-12 (cur-
rent version at 40 U.S.C. 276a(a) (1982)).
55 Act of June 13, 1934, ch. 482 Sec. 2, 48 Stat. 948 (current ver-
sion at 40 U.S.C. 276(c) (1982)).
56 The House and Senate Reports stated that predetermination of
wages "would strengthen the present law considerably since at present
the Secretary of Labor is not permitted to fix the minimum wage rates
until a dispute has arisen in the course of construction. In practice this
has meant that in the early stages of the contract, unscruplous contrac-
tors have defied orders of the contracting officers to pay the prevailing
rate until a formal adjucdication has been requested of the the Secretary
of Labor. This means that laborers and mechanics who were underpaid
until the decision was rendered had no redress since it has been held that
the decisions of the Secretary could not operate retroactively." S. Rep.
No. 1155,74th Cong, 1st Sess., 2-3 (1935); H.R. Rep. No. 1756,74th
Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3 (1935) (quoted in Universities Reserach Ass'n v.
Coutu 450 U.S. 1451, 1464, n.27. (1981)).
57 Act of July 2, 1964, P.L. 88-349 Sec. 1, 78 Stat. 238 (current
version at 40 U.S.C. 276a(b) (1982)).
58 110 Cong. Rec. 1217 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Halpem).
59 The contractor has little if any opportunity to seek out cost sav-
ings in other areas. In the case of building materials, for example, which
represent a sizable portion of total cost, there is little the contractor can
do to achieve saving. These materials are usually spelled out in considerable
detail in the design specification included in construction contracts. Thus,
except for differences that may exist between contractors with respect
to managerial capabilities the industry is and always will be tailor made
for competition to impact on wages. The Davis-Bacon Act: It Works to
Build America, supra note 52, at 67.
60 Marshall, America Still Needs Davis-Bacon, Nat'l. J. Pol'y
Analysis 1839 (1981).
61 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Compensation in the Construction
Industry: Employment Patterns, Union Scales and Earnings 1 (Bulletin
1656, 1970) [hereinafter BLS].
62 Id. See also Oversight Hearings supra note 14 at 113 (testimony
of Robert Georgine, President, Building and Constr. Trades Dept., AFL-
CIO). ' he construction industry is plagued by persistently high unemploy-
ment. For instance, in 1985 the unemployment rate in the constuction
industry averaged 13.1 percent as compared to 7.2 percent for the
economy as a whole. In 1984, the last year with available data, 6,762,000
people worked in the construction industry. Of this figure, 2,374,000 were
unemployed at some time during the year, which ... works out to ap-
proximately 34.4 percent of the total construction work force."
63 Interview with Tom Hopkins, supra note 35.
64 BLS, supra note 61, at 2.
65 US. Small Business Administration, Office of Economic
Research, U.S. Enterprise and Employment Microdata File (1984) reprinted
in Oversight Hearings supra note 14 at 90.
66 The low capital investment requirements have been pointed to
by some as a major cause of corruption in the construction industry. Such
a phenomenon along with the huge profits to be gained by successful con-
tractors encourages the participation of unscrupulous contractors, little
concerned with the quality of construction, the stability of the industry
or the welfare of the worker. See Oversight Hearings supra note 14 at
113 (statement of Robert Georgine, President, Building and Constr. Trades
Dept., AFL-CIO). "(C)onstruction firms are constantly being formed and
dissolved. It is the ease of entry, in particular, that makes the construc-
tion industry vulnerable to the fly-by-night, undercapitalized operators who
can readily form and dissolve construction companies to suit their
sometimes devious purposes." Id.
67 40 U.S.C. 276c (1982).
68 Marshall, supra note 60, at 1838. This practice, explained In the
words of one construction contractor, is quite prevelant and harms not
only workers, but fair, law-abiding contractors. "In the area of enforce-
ment, I think that as a contractor the thing I resent more than anything
else is having a gamed played where the opposition has a different ball
and bat than I do. I don't mind going out there and competing.... But
I like everyone to play the same game, I don't like to see contractors out
there that have two checks and one is the certified payroll and they have
D0 IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
it signed and passed back to the employer, and another one that is sign-
ed and passed to the employee." Oversight Hearings supra note 14 at
268 (statement of Dan Lowry, President of Grade Way Construction).
69 See 29 C.F.R. 5.5(a)(3) (1988), detailing submission and preser-
vation of weekly payroll records. 'Payroll and basic records relating thereto
shall be maintained by the contractor during the course of the work and
preserved for a period of three years thereafter ... Such records shall
contain the name, address, and social security of each such worker, his
or her correct classification, hourly rates of wages paid... daily and week-
ly hours worked, deductions made and actual wages paid." Id.
70 This author's hunch from having done some investigations into
"little" Davis-Bacon violations the summer of 1988 is that this form of
abuse, since it is so imperceptibly subtle, and is so unlikely to be caught,
goes on quite frequently.
71 Cf. Interview with Skip Easterly, supra note 35; Interview with
Tom Hopkins, supra note 35.
72 The Davis Bacon Act: It Works to Build America, supra note
49, at 26, n.26. See also Oversight Hearings supra note 14 at 343
(testimony of Terry Bumpers, Director of National Joint Heavy and
Highway Construction Committee). "Another method of cheating workers
which can be detected by reviewing the certified payrolls is working peo-
ple outside of their proper pay-classifications. The most common method,
though, is to classify employees as laborers which just happens to be the
lowest pay rate and then require them to do carpentry and other work.
We have seen several instances whereas much as 80 percent of the total
certified payroll is classified as laborers."
73 Oversight Hearings supra note 14 at 360 (prepared statement
of Terry Bumpers).
74 29 C.F.R. 5.5(a)(4)(i) & (ii) (1988) "Apprentices will be permit-
ted to work at less than the predetermined rate for the work they per-
formed when they are employed pursuant to and individually registered
in a bona fide apprenticeship program registered with the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor. ... "
75 See Hill, Minorities, Women and the Davis-Bacon Act, Nat'l.
J., Pol'y F. 1701 (1981).
76 Interview with Bob Devore, supra note 35. Statistics for previous
years reveal that in 1987 of the 2722 investigations undertaken 2130
resulted in finding of violations with $16,126,377 being recovered for
18,496 employees. In 1986 of the 2739 investigations undertaken 2200
resulted in findings of violations with $15,599,778 being recovered for
19,288 employees and in 1985 of the 2561 investigations 2051 resulted
in violations with $12,987,785 being recovered for 17,456 employees.
77 Janik Paving & Construction Inc. v. Brock, 828 F. 2d 84 (2nd
Cir. 1987). This case involved violations of the Contract Work Hours
and Safety Standards Act, 40 U.S.C. 327-33 (1982), a statute contain-
ing Davis-Bacon provisions [hereinafter CWHSSA]. CWHSSA requires
contractors to pay overtime rates for hours worked in excess of forty-
hour work weeks. Enforcement of CWHSSA is subject to the same
regulatory scheme which applies to Davis-Bacon.
78 Janik 828 F.2d. at 86.
79 Id.
80 Testimony Before the N.Y. State Senate & Assembly Comm.
on Labor, March 3, 1983 (statement of Tom Hopkins, Field Represen-
tative I.U.O.E., Local 17).
81 Telephone interview with Mr. Stanley, Public Works Division,
N.Y.S. Dept. of Labor (Nov.16, 1988).
82 However, it was intimated that this Wage & Hour Division pro-
bably does more Davis-Bacon enforcement than any other in the coun-
try, at least in terms of bringing criminal charges. Interview with Skip Easter-
ly, supra note 35. Mr. Easterly attributed this partially to the willingness
of the U.S. Attorney for the W.D.N.Y. to take these kind of cases. See
also infra note 97 and accompanying text.
83 Janik Paving 828 F.2d at 87. "The Division found that Janik had
failed to pay $1123.72 in overtime compensation to 9 employees who
worked on the Edison contract ... and $13,670.74 to 21 of Janik's
employees performing similar work on the Route 16 contract. As the result
of investigation, the Division also determined that Janik falsified its payroll
records by reducing reported hours . .. " Id. at 87 n. 2.
84 Id. at 87. Prior to the hearing Janik agreed to pay the affected
workers $13,000 in back overtime pay.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 88.
87 Id. at 94.
88 It also illustrates the possible extent to which the public is cheated
out of the quality of workmanship that they expect their tax dollars to
purchase. In an audit conducted by the inspector general of the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development, published in November 1985,
the HUD inspector general concluded that there is a direct relationship
between labor standards violations and construction deficiencies. Over-
sight Hearings, supra note 14, at 22 (statement of Hon. Austin J Mur-
phy, Chairman, Subcomm. on Labor Standards). Such a correlation is
understandable because violators often use inexperienced or unskilled
workers and shortcut construction methods therby resulting in poor quality
results. But see, Metzger and Goldfarb, 'Do Davis-Bacon Minimum Wages
Raise Product Quality?", 3 J. of Lab. Res. 272 (1983). The authors
of this article argue that forcing a contractor to purchase more expensive
labor may result in fewer units of labor being used, or in the substitution
of materials of lesser quality so that output quality need not rise at all
and may, in fact, fall.
89 See supra note 35.
90 See supra note 66 and accompaying text.
91 See e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
2000e-3; "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employ-
ment ... because he opposed any practice made an unlawful employ-
ment practice by this subchaper, or because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, pro-
ceeding or hearing under this subchapter." See also National Labor Rela-
tions Act, 29 U.S.C. 157; Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C.
660; Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. 815(c); Atomic
Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. 5951; Surface Transportation Assistance Act of
1982, 49 U.S.C.App.2305.
92 See Howard, Current Developments in Whistleblower Protection,
39 Lab. L. J. 67, 69 (1988).
93 Id.
94 Id. at 80.
95 See J. Atleson, R. Rabin, G. Schatzki, H. Sherman &
E. Silverstein, Collective Bargaining in Private Employment
332-36 (2d ed. 1984).
96 40 U.S.C. 276c (1982).
97 Rothstein, Knapp & Leibman supra note 37 at 327.
98 Interview with Mr. Easterly supra note 35. Interview with Mr.
Stanley supra note 81.
99 See Oversight Hearings supra note 14 at 6 (statement of William
E. Brock, Secretary of Labor, U.S. DOL). See also Id. at 3 (statement
of Rep. Bartlett) ("There are some rather significant compliance problems
.*. adding to paperwork requirements that are of no benefit to anyone.
Some data we received right before the House floor indicate that there
are some 11 million submission forms per year, 11 million pieces of paper
that have to be submitted to the Department of Labor by individual con-
tractors about their wage reports.).
100 FLSA 29 CFR 516 "Records to be Kept by Employers."
101 Funk, The Paperwork Reduction Act: Paperwork Reduction
Meets Administrative Law, 24 Harv. J. on Legis. 7, 106 (1987).
The Painting and Drywall Work Preservation Fund, a joint industry-
labor fund, termed certified payroll records as the "key source of documen-
tary proof of prevailing wage violations." Public Works Manual, Painting
and Drywall Work Preservation Fund, Inc., VIII B-2 (June 1984) reprinted
in Oversight Hearings supra note 14 at 354.
102 Oversight Hearings supra note 14 at 342 (testimony of Terry
Bumpers, Director of National Joint Heavy and Highway Construction
Committee).
103 Cf. interview with Skip Easterly supra note 35. "The DOL is
more prone to show up at a worker's dinner table with an FBI agent than
SPRING 1989 41
I
any federal agency." Id.
104 Wolk, Mr. Davis-Mr. Bacon - But Who Is The Enforcer 15
Lab. L. J. 323,326 (1964). See also Allen, supra note 14, at 735. "Since
the contracting agencies (1)can produce more projects (and thus satisfy
more constituents) with a given budgetary allotment if contractors ignore
Davis-Bacon standards and (2)receive no rewards for upholding these stan-
dards, they are unlikely to invest more than a token amount of resources
in enforcement. Id.
105 See supra note 35.
106 Oversight Hearings supra note 14 at 301 (testimony of Richard
Stem, Assistant Director, Economic Department, Intl Brotherhood of
Teamsters)
107 Oversight Hearings supra note 14, at 4 (statement of Rep.
Williams, Subcomm, on Labor Standards). See also Fine supra note 5,
at 73. "Prevailing wage is good for communities. When workers are paid
more, they have more money to put into the economy. In researching
our county ordinance, we found that the increase of one dollar paid a
worker in construction resulted in seventy-six cents of additional income
to the area." Id.
108 See Oversight Hearings, supra note 14 at 114 (testimony of
Robert Georgine, President, Building and Constr. Trades Dept., AFL-CIO).
"Most of these violations are discovered not by the Federal contracting
agencies or the DOL, but by local building trades union or joint labor-
management organizations whose principle purpose to to monitor
unscrupulous contractors who cheat their employees as well as the Federal
Government." Id.
109 "For example, in some localities, committees jointly funded by
unions and contractors have been established to act as watch dogs for
Davis-Bacon violations. In Northern California, an organization known
as the Foundation For Fair Contracting was established last year and is
being funded to the tune of $800,000 to oversee compliance with the
act. Thus far they have been instrumental in uncovering hundreds of
thousands of dollars in unpaid wages. Similar organizations are spring-
ing up in other parts of the United States." Oversight Hearings supra note
14 at 344 (testimony of Terry Bumpers).
110 5 U.S.C. 552.
111 Letter from Robert Georgine, Pres. of Buidling & Constr. Trades
Dept. to Hon. A. Murphy, Chairman of Subcomm. on Labor Standards
(Nov. 14, 1986) reprinted in Oversight Hearings, supra note 14 at 168.
112 IBEW Local 41 v. HUD, 593 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C 1984).
113 Id.
114 IBEW Local 41 v. HUD, 763 F. 2d 435 (D.C.Cir. 1985).
115 Letter from Robert Georgine supra note 111 at 170. It should
be noted that HUD is not the only agency denying these requests. For
example, a FOIA request this summer (1988) by the author while work-
ing for Local 17 of I.U.O.E. to the Manager of Design and Construction
of the U.S. Postal Service requesting amongst other things, certified payrolls
for a constuction project let by the U.S. Postal Service resulted in a denial
letter stating that disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted inva-
sion of personal privacy. However, an appeal to the General Counsel of
the Post Office in Washington, DC did result, some four months later,
in the release of such payroll records. Letter from Charles Hawley, Assis-
tant General Counsel, Administrative Law Division of U.S. Postal Ser-
vice to Lisa Morowitz (Oct, 5, 1988) (on file with the author).
116 29 C.F.R. 5.6(a)(4) (1988).
117 Oversight Hearings supra note 14 at 344 (testimony of Terry
Bumpers).
118 Jenero & Leader, Implied Private Right of Action Under the
Davis-Bacon Act: Closing Some Loopholes in Administrative Enforce-
ment, 29 De Paul L. Rev. 793, 817 (1980).
119 756 F.2d 870 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
120 Id.
121 Id. at 871-72.
122 Id. at 872.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 873.
125 Id.
126 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
127 Unity Bank, 756 F. 2d at 873.
128 "Valuing social goals and ranking moral choices adds great com-
plexity to the realm of economic analysis." Schooner, Impossibility of Per-
formance in Public Contracts: An Economic Analysis, 16 Pub. Cont.
L.J. 229, 262 (1986).
129 Oversight Hearings supra note 14, at 31 (statement of Rep.
Williams, Subcomm. on Labor Standards).
42 IN THE PUBUC INTEREST
